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Abstract
This paper analyzes the impact of the European Union regional policy of the three
programming periods 1975-1988, 1989-1993 and 1994-1999 on the dynamics of pro-
ductivity of European regions. On average, funding had a positive, but concave,
effect on productivity growth. In particular, a share of funds on GVA of 10% GVA
is estimated to raise the regional growth rate of about 0.9% per year. However, by
separately considering the three programming periods and the composition of the
funds according to the objectives defined by the EU, we find that: i) only the funds
allocated in the second and third programming periods, when they remarkably in-
creased, had a significant impact; and ii) only Objective 1 and Cohesion funds played
a significantly positive impact, while funds devoted to Objectives 2, 3, 4 and 5 had a
negative or non significant impact. The results are robust to potential endogeneity
of funds and spatial dependence.
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I. Introduction
The European Union utilizes a relevant part of its budget (about 35% for the period 2007-
2013) to promote social and economic cohesion among the regions of its member states. The
main instrument is represented by the Structural Funds, which are essentially allocated on
regional basis. The Structural Funds are directed towards different aims: physical and human
capital accumulation, development of transport infrastructures, aid to the unemployed, support
to declining sectors, etc. The overall goal can in general be intended as promoting the compet-
itiveness of European regions (Articles 130(f)-130(p), Single European Act, 1987) and, at the
same time: “at reducing disparities between the levels of development of various regions, and
the backwardness of the less-favoured regions” (Article 130(a), Single European Act, 1987).
The debate among economists on the effectiveness of EU funds has been mostly carried
out through analyses of convergence across European Regions, where convergence is defined in
terms of the neoclassical model of Solow (1956), or is evaluated through the dynamics of the
cross-region income (or productivity) distribution (see, e.g., Boldrin and Canova (2001)).
At present, the issue appears controversial. For example, as indirect evidence of the inef-
fectiveness of the funds, some authors point to the recent slowing down of convergence among
European regions in a period characterized by a particularly vigorous increase in funding (see,
e.g., Boldrin and Canova (2001)). However, contributions aiming at directly assessing the ef-
fectiveness of the funds by including funds in growth regressions, do not provide unanimous
results. De la Fuente and Vives (1995), Cappelen et al. (2003) and Beugelsdijk and Eijffinger
(2005) find positive effects of the funds, while in other contributions the results are more ar-
ticulated. In particular, Rodriguez-Pose and Fratesi (2004) argue that the part of the funds
devoted to creating or consolidating human capital had a positive effect on growth of backward
regions, differently from the funds devoted to the development of infrastructures. Ederveen et
al. (2006), instead, find that the funds are effective if the institutions of the recipient economy
have a sufficient institutional quality (but their analysis is carried out at country level). Esti-
mating an augmented specification of the Verdoorn’s law, Dall’erba et al. (2007) find that the
impact of funds is negative, although very small. Moreover, when they disaggregate funds by
”Objectives” (see below), Objective 1 funds turn out to have a negative effect, while the effect
of Objective 2 funds is not significant. Differently, Checherita et al. (2009) find evidence that
the overall spending of Structural and Cohesion Funds has a positive impact on growth, com-
ing in particular from the Structural Funds devoted to the development of social and human
resources, while funds devoted to agriculture have a negative impact on growth. However, the
effect of funds on growth disappears when country dummies are introduced in the regressions.
It is likely that such discrepancies depend on the differences among the various studies
with respect to the period analyzed, the sample of regions, the type of funds examined, and
the econometric techniques adopted. For example, Rodriguez-Pose and Fratesi (2004) study
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the effect of the whole structural funds for the period 1989-99 on the regions identified by
the so-called Objective 1 (that is regions with a per-capita GDP lower than 75% of European
average, see European Commission (2001)), while De la Fuente and Vives (1995) focus on the
effect of the largest Structural Fund, i.e. the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF),
on Spanish regions for the period 1986-90. Moreover, in all cases data are elaborated by the
authors on the basis of various publications of the European Union, which forced the researchers
to resort to a series of hypotheses to make the amounts of funds homogeneous across periods,
and to impute them to the individual regions or to different investment typologies.1
This paper aims at evaluating the impact of European Regional Policy on the dynamics
of labour productivity across European regions, by proposing a broader analysis than those
so far provided. Specifically, we will consider both Structural and Cohesion Funds in three
programming periods: 1975-1988, 1989-1993 and 1994-1999. We analyze labour productivity
because it appears better suited than per capita income to evaluate the goal of European
Regional Policy, i.e. increasing competitiveness of European regions. We propose a simple
growth model to capture the main aspects of funding, i.e. the size and composition of the funds,
and then we test its empirical implications on a large database that we built by gathering data
from different sources (see Section II.A. for more details).
The main findings of the paper are three. Firstly, structural and cohesion funds increase
the growth rate of productivity of the regions in the sample, but the impact appears subject to
diminishing returns. In particular, a value of 10% of the ratio funds/regional GVA is estimated
to raise on average the regional growth rate of about 0.9% per year. Moreover, this impact
is likely to be underestimated given that we use commitments instead of payments of funds.
Regions of Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, Southern Italy and Northern UK appear the have
benefitted the most from the European Regional Policy.2 Overall, since the most benefitted
regions were relatively poor, European Regional Policy favoured convergence across European
regions’ productivities. These results are robust to the potential endogeneity of funds and to
the presence of spatial dependence.
Secondly, the size of funds affects their effectiveness. Specifically, the limited size of the
funds in the first programming period (1975-1988) is associated to a non significant impact on
growth, while the impact is highly significant in the subsequent two programming periods, in
which the amount of funding remarkably increased (the share of funds on total GVA of the
regions in the sample was equal to 0.28% and 0.5% per year, respectively in the second and
third periods, against 0.06% in the first period).
Finally, the composition of funds matters, being the Objective 1 and Cohesion Funds the
most effective, while funds allocated to fulfill Objectives 2, 3, 4 and 5 show a negative or non
1See, e.g., the appendix in Rodriguez-Pose and Fratesi (2004).
2In a companion paper, Fiaschi et al. (2009) explore more deeply the impact of European Regional Policy
on the distribution of productivity across European regions.
Productivity Dynamics across European Regions 5
significant impact on regions’ productivity. Our guess is that the latter funds interfere with an
efficient reallocation of resources, in particular from less to more productive sectors.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II. summarizes the main features of European
Regional Policy and describes our database; Section III. proposes a neoclassical growth model
incorporating the main features of the European Regional Policy; Section IV. presents the
results of the empirical analysis, while Section V. contains the robustness checks for endogeneity
and spatial dependence; Section VI. concludes.
II. The European Regional Policy: an Overview
Below we summarize the different instruments used by the European Commission in three
programming periods: 1975-1988, 1989-1993 and 1994-1999.3
• 1975-1988. The European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) was established to finance
infrastructure projects and productive investment in less-favoured regions.
• 1989-1993. Regulations were adopted in 1988 to ensure these funds are rationalized and
well defined. Structural Funds were concentrated on the areas or social groups in the
greatest difficulty according to socio-economic criteria. This led to the definition of five
objectives to be reached by the use of the funds:
– Objective 1: promoting the development and structural adjustment of backward
regions, that is regions with a per capita GDP lower than 75% of EU average;
– Objective 2: revitalising areas facing structural difficulties;
– Objective 3: combating long-term unemployment;
– Objective 4: facilitating the occupational integration of young people;
– Objective 5: speeding up the adjustment of the agricultural and fishing sectors.
Community Initiative Programmes (CIP) were added to these objectives, by utilizing a
limited portion of the Structural Funds on more specific topics.
• 1994-1999. The second generation of Structural Funds is launched. In particular:
– Objectives 1, 2 and 5 remained unchanged, Objectives 3 and 4 were slightly redefined
and the entry of Austria, Finland and Sweden in the European Union led to the
creation of Objective 6, to favour regions with very low population densities;
3See http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/policy/history/ for more details.
6 D. Fiaschi, A. M. Lavezzi and A. Parenti
– CIP were slightly redefined;
– a Cohesion Fund of over 15 billions ecus was introduced to help less-developed
Member States, i.e. states with a per capita GDP below 90% of EU average, to
attain the convergence criteria that were defined for the introduction of the economic
and monetary union.
Since the reform of 1988 the generic label “Structural Funds” covers a variety of programmes.
The main funds are:
• ERDF (European Regional Development Fund). Established in 1975 and directed to
less favoured regions, it mainly focuses on productive investment, infrastructures, SME’s
development, research and development projects. It should generate growth in capital
stock, infrastructures, education, and expansion of R&D activities.
• ESF (European Social Fund). Created by the Treaty of Rome in 1986, it is targeted to
vocational training, education and employment aid. This fund covers much of Objectives
2, 3 and 4, and a portion of Objective 1. It should favour mobility of labour, raise
employment of young people and women, increase educational attainments and R&D.
• EAGGF (European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund). Introduced in 1962 as
part of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), it promotes the adjustment of the agri-
cultural sector and rural development. It should generate growth in farming employment,
productivity and income, and employment of young people in the agricultural sector.
• FIFG (Financial Instrument for Fisheries Guidance). Established in 1994 and specifi-
cally targeted to the fishing industry. It should generate growth in fishing employment,
productivity, infrastructure and income.
The purpose of the Cohesion Fund, instead, is to provide financial support for environmen-
tal investment projects and for transport infrastructure projects within the Trans-European
Transport Network (both public and private). While the former projects should generate water
treatment, transportation and environmental improvements, the latter should generate roads
and railways. Moreover, the Cohesion Fund is allocated to member states (not regions) and, in
particular, only countries in line with the program of convergence in the monetary union are
eligible.
We submit that the criteria for the allocation of funds do not unambiguously appear directed
towards an increase in productivity of regions. In fact, only Objective 1 funds and Cohesion
Funds are explicitly targeted to the poorest regions in order to favour productivity catching-
up. On the contrary, Objective 2 funds and the support to the agricultural and fishing sectors
provided by Objective 5 may actually slow down the productivity growth as long as such
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funding interferes with the ongoing structural change, in which mature sectors are gradually
replaced by more innovative sectors, the size of the agricultural and fishing sectors are shrinking
and workers are reallocated to more productive sectors.4 These types of fundings should be
therefore considered more income support than stimuli to productivity growth.5 In the same
respect, Objectives 4, 6 and other types of funds of limited amount appear to be mainly income
support.
The discussion would suggest that a breakdown of funds on the basis of the programmes
listed above would be very useful for a better understanding of the impact of the Structural
Funds on European regional productivity. Unfortunately, this is not possible because a regional
breakdown of committed funds is only available for total Structural Funds.
II.A. Our Structural and Cohesion Funds Dataset
Data on Structural Funds used in this paper come from different publications of the Euro-
pean Commission. Data cover the first three programming periods, in particular:
• data for 1975-1988 are from European Commission (1989);
• data for 1989-1993 are from European Commission (1995) and European Commission
(1997);
• data for 1994-1999 are from European Commission (1997) and European Commission
(2000).
These data represent the total Commitments that the European Commission allocated for the
entire programming period. Data on total Payments, that is data on funds actually transferred
to regions, are available for the last programming period only. All data are transformed in 1995
constant prices.
In this paper we consider European regions at the NUTS 2 level but, since not all funds are
allocated directly to individual regions, we adopted the following criteria:
• if the fund is jointly allocated to a group of regions, we reassign it to individual NUTS
2 regions in an amount inversely proportional to their per capita GDP in the initial year
of the programming period;
• if the fund is allocated to a country, and is referred to a particular objective for which it
is possible to identify the eligible regions (for example Objective 1), then it is reassigned
to all the objective regions (e.g. Objective 1) in an amount inversely proportional to their
per capita GDP in the initial year of the programming period;
4See, e.g., Temple (2001) for a discussion on structural change in Europe and the results of Section IV..
5See, e.g., European Commission (2007).
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• if the fund is allocated at country level, but it is referred to an objective for which it is not
possible to exactly identify the eligible regions (e.g. Cohesion Funds), then we reassign
it to all the NUTS 2 regions of the country in an amount inversely proportional to their
per capita GDP in the initial year of the programming periods.
We chose to reallocate funds proportionally to per capita GDP since this is the main cri-
terium used in the allocation of most of the funds (e.g. Objective 1 and Cohesion Funds). We
also checked that equal reassignment of these funds to regions does not affect our results.
II.B. Descriptive Statistics on Structural and Cohesion Funds
The aim of the paper is to study the impact of both Structural and Cohesion Funds on
the dynamics of productivity across European Regions. Our main indicator will be the ratio
of funds on regional GVA, labeled SCF in the following.6 Table 1 shows that: i) the total
amount of these funds increased over time, raising from 0.06% of total European GVA in the
first programming period to 0.5% in the third; ii) the average value of SCF slightly decreased;
iii) the funds have been distributed more equally over time.
Programming Period SCF/Total GVA Mean SCF St. Dev. of SCF
Period I (1975-1988) 0.06 0.0054 0.0103
Period II (1989-1993) 0.28 0.0054 0.0082
Period III (1994-1999) 0.50 0.0049 0.0065
Table 1: Descriptive statistics on Structural and Cohesion Funds in three programming periods
The increase in the amount of funds is accompanied by a change in the allocation to the
different objectives. Table 2 illustrates such changes. In particular, even though Objective 1
attracts the largest amount of funds, between the second and the third period funds devoted
to the Cohesion Policy have remarkably increased.7 Objective 2 funds have a relevant size in
the last two periods, and increased their relative weight in the third.
6Data on regional GVA and employment are from Cambridge Econometrics (2004).
7Given that the Objectives were not defined in the first programming period, we label the whole allocation
“Objective 0”.
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Objective Period I (1975-1988) Period II (1989-1993) Period III (1994-1999)
0 100 - -
1 - 63.23 61.67
2 - 8.94 9.05
3 - - 6.68
4 - - 1.22
3 & 4 - 10.10 -
5 - 9.55 6.85
6 - - 0.38
NL - 4.66 -
PIM - 1.02 -
2 In. - - 3.07
Other In. - - 1.68
Cohesion - 2.50 9.39
Tot. 100 100 100
Table 2: Shares of commitments of funds according to Objectives. “NL”: New La¨nder in
Germany in Period II; “PIM”: regional program in Period II for regions outside Objective 1;
“2 In.”: regional initiatives similar to Objective 2 for period III (Adapt, Employment, Rechard,
Resider, Retex, Konver, SMEs), “Other In.”: other initiatives in Period III (Leader, Regis,
Urban, Pesca, Peace)
Table 3 reports the share of SCF allocated to regions with a per worker GVA lower than the
75% of the sample mean (i.e. the least productive regions). Looking at the total funds, only
35−55% of total Structural and Cohesion Funds appears to be allocated to the least productive
regions. The share is higher for Objectives 1 and Cohesion Funds given the fact that they are
allocated according to the per capita GDP of the regions.8 On the contrary, funds devoted to
Objectives 2-5 seem to be mainly allocated to more productive regions, especially in the third
programming period (almost 30%).
8The correlation between the per capita GDP and the per worker GVA of regions in the three programming
periods is very high and, respectively, equal to 0.87, 0.83 and 0.86.
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Period I (1975-1988) Period II (1989-1993) Period III (1994-1999)
All.Obj 54.03 47.13 35.15
Ob. 1 - 66.18 43.61
Ob. 2 - 11.70 4.68
Ob. 3 & 4 - 18.81 8.36
Ob. 5 - 8.00 3.51
Ob. NL & PIM & 6 - 0 0
Ob. 2 In. & Other In. - - 28.01
Cohesion - 63.22 61.50
Table 3: Percentage of SCF given to regions with per worker GVA below 75% of sample mean
II.C. Commitments vs Payments
So far the analysis has focused on the commitments of funds. However, the amount of
funds actually spent by the regions is likely to be what effectively matters to measure the
impact of funds on regions’ productivity. Table 4 reports the ratio between Commitments and
Payments for each country of the sample. The generalized reduction of this ratio from the first
to the third period might be explained by the regulation adopted in 1988 and, in particular,
by the adoption of the additionality principle.9 Some countries, like Spain and Ireland, have
however maintained high ratios of payments on commitments over the three periods, while
other countries, like United Kingdom, Netherlands and Italy, had very low ratios (especially in
the third programming period).
9According to the additionality principle, the Structural Funds are not intended to be utilized as a substitute
for national funding, but rather to provide additional assistance. The Member States were thus under the
obligation to maintain their public expenditure at the level of the beginning of the programming period.
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Period I Period II Period III
Country (1975-1988) (1989-1993) (1994-1999)
AT - - 0.59
BE 0.95 0.81 0.70
DE 0.95 0.82 0.71
DK 0.96 0.78 0.76
ES 0.76 0.84 0.80
FI - - 0.63
FR 1.10 0.82 0.70
GR 1.08 0.83 0.72
IE 0.92 0.93 0.86
IT 0.88 0.70 0.60
LU 0.47 0.58 0.67
NL 0.99 0.76 0.60
PT 0.98 0.89 0.88
SE - - 0.70
UK 0.93 0.80 0.64
Table 4: Ratio of Payments on Commitments in the three periods at country level
Overall, the heterogeneity in the ratio of payments on commitments across countries in the
sample suggests to control also for payments in order to have a more precise estimate of the
actual impact of SCF on productivity.
To sum up, we have documented that: i) the resources devoted by the European Union to
the Regional Policy have increased over the three programming periods; ii) the largest amount of
Structural Funds is allocated to reach Objective 1; iii) the share allocated as Cohesion Funds is
relatively large, and has remarkably increased over the last programming period; iii) Objective
2 funding is also substantial, relatively to the other objectives different from 1.
In the next section we propose a growth model incorporating the main aspects of EU funding,
and derive its empirical implications in terms of productivity growth and convergence.
III. A Neoclassical Model of Growth and Regional Convergence
In this section we present a simple neoclassical model of economic growth with regional
policy based on Solow (1956) and Barro (1990).10
10Current discussion on convergence and regional policies in Europe also focuses on spatial aspects, i.e. on
possible spillovers across neighbour regions, agglomeration effects, etc. (see, e.g., Puga (2002)). In our model
we abstract from these aspects and from possible patterns of regional specialization, although we will include
them as controls in the empirical analysis of Section IV..
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Output of region i, Yi, is defined as:
Yi = Φ(SCF i)F (Ki, ALi) , (1)
where SCF i indicates the funds allocated to region i (with respect to the level of output), Ki
and Li are its capital stock and number of workers, and A measures the exogenous level of
technology.11 Function F (·) has the standard properties of a neoclassical production function,
i.e. it is increasing and concave in both arguments (i.e. ∂F/∂Ki and ∂F/∂ALi > 0, ∂
2F/∂K2i
and ∂2F/∂AL2i < 0) and is homogeneous of degree 1.
Function Φ(·) captures the impact of structural funds on the output of region i. We assume
that Φ(·) is increasing in its argument(s), i.e. Φ′(·) > 0, and that Φ(0) = 1, i.e. the availability
of structural funds is not essential to carry out production.
With this specification, the marginal product of private factors positively depends on SCF.12
Eq. (1) appears a very flexible way of introducing the structural funds into the production
function. Section III.C. discusses an extension to the case of different types of funds.
Following Solow (1956), we assume that the investment rate of region i is constant and
equal to si. Thus, the equation describing capital accumulation in region i is:
K˙i = siYi − δKi, (2)
where δ is the depreciation rate of capital (assumed for simplicity equal for all regions). From
Eqq. (1) and (2) we have:
K˙i = siΦ (SCFi)F (Ki, ALi)− δKi,
from which:
K˙i
Ki
=
siΦ (SCFi)F (Ki, ALi)
Ki
− δ.
Assuming that A and Li grow, respectively, at constant rates g and ni, we have:
˙ˆ
ki
kˆi
=
siΦ (SCFi) f(kˆi)
kˆi
− (δ + ni + g), (3)
where kˆi ≡ Ki/ALi is the capital per worker measured in efficient units, and f ≡ F (Ki/ALi, 1),
with f(·)′ > 0 and f(·)′′ < 0.
11For the sake of simplicity we omit the time subscripts.
12Public expenditure in Barro (1990) has the same impact on output as SCF.
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III.A. Equilibrium
Eq. (3) implicitly defines the equilibrium level of kˆ∗i , i.e.:
f(kˆ∗i )
kˆ∗i
=
δ + ni + g
siΦ (SCFi)
. (4)
Eq. (4) highlights that an increase in the level SCFi leads to an increase in the equilibrium
level of capital (as f(kˆ∗i )/kˆ
∗
i is decreasing in kˆ
∗
i ). This is a general conclusion for an economy
with a production function as in Eq. (1).13
From Eq. (4) (or Eq. (5)) it is straightforward to show that the effect of funds on the
equilibrium level of capital is positive but decreasing, i.e. dkˆ∗i /dSCFi is decreasing in SCFi,
when ∂2Φ/∂SCF 2i < 0.
III.B. Transitional Dynamics to Equilibrium
The presence of structural funds also affects the transitional dynamics to equilibrium and
the relative speed of convergence. Assume that F (·) is Cobb-Douglas, i.e.:
F (Ki, ALi) = K
α
i (ALi)
1−α , 0 < α < 1,
from which:
f(kˆi) = kˆ
α
i .
From Eq. (4) we have that:
kˆ∗i =
[
siΦ (SCFi)
δ + ni + g
] 1
1−α
and yˆ∗i =
[
siΦ (SCFi)
δ + ni + g
] α
1−α
(6)
The log-linearization around the equilibrium level of output leads to:
log yˆi,t =
(
1− e−λit
)
log yˆ∗i + e
−λit log yi,0, (7)
where λi measures the speed of convergence, yˆi,t and yˆi,0 are, respectively, output in efficiency
units at period t and period 0. Considering that the values of yˆi are unobservable, and de-
13Assuming a standard intertemporal optimization framework with agents having an intertemporal elasticity
of substitution equal to 1/σ (e.g. with instantaneous utility given by c1−σ/ (1− σ)), and with a discount rate
given by ρ, the equilibrium level of capital in efficient units is implicitly defined by:
∂f(kˆi)
∂kˆi
∣∣∣∣∣
kˆi=kˆ∗i
=
ρ+ δ + σg
Φ (SCFi)
. (5)
Again, kˆ∗
i
is a positive function of SCFi.
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noting labour productivity in region i as yi = Yi/Li = yˆi/A, some manipulations lead to the
approximate (around the equilibrium) transitional dynamics of output:14
γi =
log yi,t − log yi,0
t
= g + β log yˆ0 − β log yˆ
∗
i − βlogAi,0, (8)
where γi is the average growth rate of productivity between period 0 and period t, and β =
(1− e−λt)/t (assuming that λi = λ, ∀i).
By introducing the expression for yˆ∗i in Eq. (8), we obtain:
γi = g − βlogAi,0 + β log yi,0 −
αβ
1− α
log si +
αβ
1− α
log(δ + ni + g)−
αβ
1− α
log Φ(SCF i). (9)
Eq. (9) represents the basis of our empirical analysis. Basically, it tests the empirical
predictions of the Solow model modified by the introduction of funds. If the estimated value
of β is negative, investments have a positive impact on growth, labour force growth has a
negative impact, as the initial level of output. The latter effect would imply β-conditional
convergence. Structural funds are instead expected to have a positive impact, i.e. ∂γi/∂SCFi =
−(αβ/1− α)(Φ′(SCF i)/Φ(SCF i)) > 0. Therefore, cœteris paribus, regions receiving more
funding should grow faster. Finally, the marginal impact of SCFi on γi, i.e. ∂γi/∂SCFi, is
increasing or decreasing with respect to SCFi depending on the sign of Φ
′′(·). According to the
law of decreasing marginal returns, we expect that the marginal effect of funds is decreasing as
the total amount of funds increases, that is Φ′′(·) < 0, and, therefore, ∂2γi/∂SCFi
2 should be
negative.
III.C. Extensions and Caveats
Possible extensions to the baseline model can address two relevant issues. The first is the
actual impact of structural funds on the output of region i. In Section II. we have described
many types of funds and have argued that some funds appear explicitly aiming at improving
productivity in the poorest regions (e.g. Objective 1 funds and Cohesion Funds), while others
appear more targeted to subsidize the income of, e.g., workers employed in certain sectors (e.g.
Objectives 2 and 5 funds). Therefore Eq. (1) could be rewritten as:
Yi = Φ
(
SCFOB1i , SCF
OB2
i , ...
)
F (Ki, ALi) ,
where SCFOB1i are structural funds for Objective 1, SCF
OB2
i are structural funds for Objective
2, etc. From the very definitions of the objectives, therefore, it is possible to conjecture that
different types of funds may have a different impact on the output of region i. In extreme cases,
14See Durlauf et al. (2005), pp. 577-579.
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when the fund interferes with the reallocation of labour from a less productive sector to a more
productive one (e.g. from the agricultural sector to industrial sectors), cœteris paribus, it could
negatively affect regional productivity. In short, it is possible that for some Objective J :
∂Yi
∂SCFOBJi
≤ 0. (10)
In the empirical analysis we will show that such case is indeed possible (in particular for
Objective 2 funds).
The second aspect is that Eq. (3) neglects any inflow and outflow of capital and labour.
For European regions these assumptions appears to be very restrictive given the high mobility
of both factors, at least within national borders.15 Taking into account these features should
increase the speed of convergence across the regions, reducing the importance of the saving
rates of the individual regions with respect to their investment rates.
Finally, we remark that the model does not consider how SCF are financed i.e., differ-
ently from Barro (1990), we do not consider a budget constraint of the EU. This prevents us
to consider the funds’ allocation that could maximize the aggregate growth of the European
economy.
IV. Empirical Analysis
This section evaluates the empirical implications of the model of Section III.. Our baseline
specification is based on Eq. (9). In particular, it adds to the regressors identified in Eq. (9) a
vector Z of controls which should capture other possible regional growth determinants which,
in the original specification of Mankiw et al. (1992) should be captured by the initial level of
technology Ai,0, and a region-specific shock υi. Moreover, we specify Φ(·) as:
Φ(SCF i) = e
η1SCF i+η2SCF
2
i , (11)
which respects our assumptions, i.e., Φ(0) = 1 and Φ′(·) > 0, and allows for the presence of
nonlinearities in the effects of the funds, i.e. it allows to test whether ∂2γi/∂SCFi
2 is negative
by the estimated value of η2.
Hence, assuming no constraints on the coefficients, we have:
γi = intercept+βy0 log yi,0−βs log si+βn log(δ+ni+g)+βSCFSCFi+βSCF 2SCF
2
i +βZ+υi, (12)
where βSCF = −(βαη1)/(1− α), βSCF 2 = −(βαη2)/(1− α), and β is the vector collecting the
coefficients of the control variables Z.
15But see the remarks of Puga (1999) and Puga (2002) on the low mobility of labour in Europe.
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IV.A. Results
We study the period 1980-2002, and consider regions at NUTS 2 level for 12 EU countries.
In particular, we do not consider Austria, Finland and Sweden since they jointed in the EU
only on 1 January 1995 and, consequently, they received funds only in the third programming
period.16 Our dependent variable is the annual average growth rate of per worker GVA of a
region. For short, we will indicate this as labour productivity.
We will include as explanatory variables:17 the share of funds on regional GVA with a
three-year lag SCF ;18 the initial productivity level, normalized with respect to sample aver-
age (PROD.REL1980 ); some variables suggested by the standard Solow model and present
in the model of Section III., such as the average annual investment rate (INV.RATE ), and
the average annual employment growth rate (EMP.GR). In addition, following Fiaschi and
Lavezzi (2007), we add: the density of economic activity (ECO.DEN ), measured by GVA
per km2, to control for the possible presence of agglomeration effects (see Ciccone and Hall
(1996)); some variables that control for the structure of the regional economy, such as the ini-
tial value of the relative share of GVA in Manufacturing (MAN1980 ), Mining (MINEG1980 ),
Construction (COSTR1980 ), Non Market Services (NMS1980 ), Financial Services (FIN1980 ),
Hotels and Restaurants (HOT1980 ), Transportation (TRANSP1980 ), Wholesale and Retail
(WHR1980 ), Other Services (OS1980 ). We separately consider the effect of the size of the
agricultural sector, by utilizing the change between 1980 and 2002 of the agricultural share on
GVA (DELTA.SHARE.AGRI ). Furthermore, we consider a variable to control for the possible
presence of spatial effects (SPATIAL.IDX ), which are indicated as relevant by a large litera-
ture on regional convergence.19 Finally, we introduce country dummies (excluding Germany)
to capture the effects of variables like political institutions, regulation in labour and product
markets, educational systems, etc., i.e. variables whose dimension is typically national, or for
which we have not data at regional level.
The average growth rate of employment EMP.GR is augmented by the rate of depreciation
of capital,20 but not by the long-run trend of productivity, as the latter is already taken into
16Appendix A contains the list of regions.
17Appendix B contains the descriptive statistics of the variables.
18Specifically, for a given programming period, we consider the yearly average level of funds for the whole
period divided by the level of GVA at the beginning of the period. For example, the growth rate of productivity
over the period 1980-2000 is regressed on the yearly average of funds relative to the period 1977-1999 divided
by the level of GVA in 1977. Results are robust to alternative lags (1-4 years). Moreover, results are similar
when region ES63 (Ceuta and Melilla) is removed from the sample (the value of region ES63’s GVA appears
uncertain, given that the values reported in Cambridge Econometrics (2004) and in Eurostat-Regio datasets
present a huge discrepancy for the most recent years).
19See Magrini (2004). Our variable is based on the Getis and Ord index and it is calculated on the basis of
the geographical distance among regions. The index takes on a positive value when high productivity values
are clustered together, while it takes negative values when low values are clustered together. See Fiaschi and
Lavezzi (2007) for details. A further treatment of spatial dependence is presented in Section V..
20Given that we do not have data on capital at regional level, we use the value of 0.03 proposed by Mankiw
et al. (1992).
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account by considering relative productivity. The initial composition of output leads to a better
definition of the initial level of productivity of a region and provides useful information on the
role of different sectors; the change in the size of the agricultural sector should capture a relevant
aspect of structural change of the regional economies, on the assumption that a reduction of
the size of the agricultural sector should positively contribute to productivity, if workers are
reallocated to more productive sectors (e.g. manufacturing).
Table 5 contains the results of our preferred OLS specification with and without the variable
SCF.21
without SCF with SCF with SCF2
COUNTRY DUMMIES YES YES YES
SECTORAL CONTROLS YES YES YES
SPATIAL CONTROLS YES YES YES
Intercept −0.0034
(0.6439)
0.0007
(0.9341)
0.0037
(0.6811)
log(PROD.REL.1980) −0.0174
(0.0000)
−0.0167
(0.0000)
−0.0158
(0.0000)
log(INV.RATE) 0.0034
(0.1596)
0.0040
(0.1426)
-
log(EMP.GR) −0.0061
(0.032)
−0.0069
(0.0006)
−0.0047
(0.0299)
SCF - 0.0466
(0.0056)
0.1855
(0.0093)
SCF2 - - −0.8677
(0.0317)
Obs. 173 R¯2 = 0.679 R¯2 = 0.739 R¯2 = 0.742
Table 5: Best linear models with and without SCF. Dependent variable: annual average growth
rate of GVA per worker. Estimation method: OLS; p-values in parenthesis, based on White-
heteroskedasticity robust standard errors.
In the second column of Table 5 we see that the variable SCF is significant, and that it
positively contributes to R¯2. In addition, when we introduce a quadratic term for SCF (see
the third column), we obtain significant coefficients for SCF and SCF2, and a modest further
contribution to R¯2. This suggests that, on average, regional productivity benefited from the
funds distributed in the three programming periods, but the estimated relationship between
SCF and the productivity growth rate is concave.22
In addition, Table 5 reveals the presence of conditional convergence, as the coefficients on
initial productivity are negative, statistically significant and quite stable across specifications,
and shows that the growth rate of the labour force reduces growth, while the investment rate
21This is obtained by estimating first of all a regression with all the explanatory variables, and sequentially
eliminating the least significant, in order to obtain the highest goodness of fit measured by the adjusted R2.
See Wooldridge (2003), pp. 192-296.
22In a regression not including sectoral controls and the quadratic term for SCF, the term for SCF is not
significantly different from zero (its p-value is equal to 0.35).
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has not a significant effect.23
Figure 1 reports the curve based on the estimated coefficients of SCF and SCF2, which
highlights the decreasing marginal impact of SCF on productivity growth.24
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Figure 1: Estimated impact of SCF on the growth rate of productivity
The impact of SCF appears sizable: starting from zero, an increase of one standard deviation
of SCF (equal to 0.02) produces an increase of approximately 0.3 points of the average annual
productivity growth rate.
Table 6 contains the results of various robustness checks and extensions of the best linear
model (all performed by applying OLS). In particular, we checked the stability of the estimated
coefficients of funds in different periods, and separately considered the effects of different types
of funds. We considered a quadratic term for the fund(s) in all the models presented.
In particular, Model I is based on a pooled regression with dummies on the different pro-
gramming periods. Period II and Period III are jointly considered for their relative shortness
(Period II lasts only five years while Period III just six years). Model II is based on a pooled
regression with dummies on the different programming periods (again Period II and III are
jointly considered) and on the coefficients of SCF. Model III and IV are cross-sections that
consider only the most substantial funds, i.e. funds given for Objective 1, the Cohesion Funds
23In the first column, the investment rate is included in the best specification, albeit with a nonsignificant
coefficient, while in the second and third columns the investment variable was dropped in the procedure to
obtain the best specification.
24The curve is plotted for the range (0− 0.10) of SCF, which contains approximately 98% of observations.
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as well as the ERDF, i.e. the only fund utilized in the first programming period when objectives
were not defined. Models V, VI and VII introduce a breakdown of the funds according to the
objectives and, therefore, are cross-sections which only cover the second and third programming
periods. Models IX and X separately consider the effects of commitments and payments for
the third programming period, being the only one for which we have data.
In Model I the effect of SCF appears nonlinear, although the quadratic term is not signifi-
cant. With respect to results in Table 5, both coefficients of SCF are lower in magnitude and
in statistical significance. This is likely due to two reasons: i) separating the funds allocated in
each period implies that the funds of the first programming period, which were low in size and
allocated to few regions, reduced the overall effect of SCF on growth; and ii) the consideration
of funding in the different periods increases the variance of the regressor, and therefore reduces
the estimated coefficient. The drop in significance can be explained by results in Model II.
Model II shows that the effect of SCF on growth in the three programming periods (the last
two are jointly considered) is remarkably different. It is not significant in Period I, while it is
significantly positive in Period II & III. Hence, the magnitude and significance of the “average”
coefficient of SCF in Model I and in Table 5 essentially depends on the effectiveness of the funds
in the second and third programming periods. We take this result as evidence of a possible
threshold effect on growth of the size of funding.
Models III and IV are cross-sections over the entire period and are focused on Objective
0, Objective 1 and Cohesion Funds. The estimates show that even separately funds have a
positive, concave and highly significant effect on growth. A comparison of the coefficients
reveals that the marginal effect is lower when the Cohesion Funds are added. This is likely
caused by the measurement error induced by our reassignment of Cohesion Funds across NUTS2
regions (recall that Cohesion Funds are allocated at country level).
Models V, VI and VII focus on the last two programming periods (since we can not break
down the funds by objectives in Period I). Model V shows that funds allocated to Objective
1 are the only ones with a positive and highly significant effect.25 Funds devoted to Objective
2 instead have a negative and significant effect. Finally, funds devoted to Objectives 3-5 do
not have a significant impact on productivity growth.26 Estimates of Models V, VI and VII
suggest that the effects of funds on growth differ across types of fund. Funds devoted to “poor”
regions have the strongest effect: from our reading of the criteria adopted by the EU, these
funds are those most likely to be directly targeted to productivity-enhancing uses. On the
contrary, funds such as those allocated to fulfil Objectives 2-5, are likely to include a higher
share devoted to distributive purposes. For example, Objective 2 funds, aiming at aiding
areas affected by serious industrial crises, as long as they try to support these industries, can
25According to the model selection based on R¯2 the quadratic term relative to Objective 1 is retained even
though not statistically significant at the usual levels of significance.
26The amounts of funds devoted to Objectives 3-5 are relatively small, and therefore have been aggregated
in the regressions.
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represent a support to inefficient activities and, therefore, interfere with an efficient allocation
of resources. The same argument can apply to Objective 5 funds, when they explicitly aim
at providing: “measures to support farm incomes and maintain activities in mountain, hill or
less-favoured areas” ( European Commission (2002)). The non statistically significance of the
estimated coefficient for Objectives 3-5 and the negative coefficient estimated for Objective 2
indicate that the impact on productivity of these funds is indeed ambiguous.
Moreover, the estimates of Models VI and VII show that Objective 1 funds and Cohesion
Funds distributed in second and in third programming periods had a significant positive, but
linear, effect on productivity growth. However, the shorter period of observation seems to
reduce the overall fit of the estimate, as shown by the decrease in R¯2 in models VI and VII.
Models VIII and IX show that the effect is highly significant for both the payments and
the commitments in the third programming period (the only one for which we have data on
commitments and payments). However, the estimated impact using the commitments seems to
underestimate the true impact of the funds, which results using the payments in the regressions.
Figure 2 compares the estimated impact of SCF on the annual growth rate of productivity
for Model VIII and IX, i.e. commitment versus payments.
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Figure 2: Estimated impact of SCF on the growth rate of productivity. Coefficients from
Models VIII and IX in Table 6.
The difference between the marginal impacts of commitments and payments reveals that
for high levels of SCF (about 0.1) the bias in the estimated impact may amount to about 0.3
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I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX
TIME DUMMIES YES YES NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
Intercept −0.0461
(0.0000)
−0.0447
(0.0000)
−0.0253
(0.0019)
−0.0250
(0.0022)
−0.1086
(0.0000)
−0.1016
(0.0009)
−0.1013
(0.0000)
−0.0615
(0.0000)
−0.0613
(0.0000)
log(PROD.1980) −0.0204
(0.0000)
−0.0211
(0.0000)
−0.0153
(0.0000)
−0.0151
(0.0000)
−0.0129
(0.0126)
−0.0137
(0.0033)
−0.0137
(0.0033)
−0.0166
(0.0016)
−0.0164
(0.0015)
log(EMP.GR) −0.0118
(0.0000)
−0.0121
(0.0000)
−0.0057
(0.0035)
−0.0056
(0.0044)
−0.0218
(0.0000)
−0.0203
(0.0000)
−0.0203
(0.0000)
−0.0221
(0.0000)
−0.0222
(0.0000)
SCF 0.0813
(0.0298)
0.1140
(0.0006)
SCF2 −0.1200
(0.3898)
−0.1723
(0.0460)
Period I∗SCF −0.0905
(0.7993)
Period I∗SCF2 15.0706
(0.1860)
(Period II & III) ∗SCF 0.0409
(0.0454)
(Period II & III)∗SCF2 −0.1217
(0.3935)
OB0.OB1 0.2355
(0.0028)
OB0.OB12 −1.3731
(0.0158)
OB0.OB1.CF 0.2178
(0.0020)
OB0.OB1.CF2 −1.1093
(0.0107)
OB1 0.1208
(0.0113)
0.1208
(0.0112)
OB12 −0.1644
(0.3636)
−0.1489
(0.3880)
OB2 −1.6653
(0.0102)
OB22 -
OB3.OB4.OB5 0.2286
(0.3176)
OB3.OB4.OB52 -
OB1.CF 0.1087
(0.0091)
OB1.CF2 −0.1331
(0.3162)
SCF.Payments 0.1755
(0.0006)
SCF.Payments2 −0.4051
(0.0260)
R¯2 0.558 0.558 0.745 0.747 0.692 0.675 0.673 0.799 0.798
Obs. 344 344 173 173 173 173 173 173 173
Table 6: Robustness checks. All regressions include country dummies, control for sectoral composition of GVA
in the initial period, and for the presence of spatial (SPAT.IDX) and agglomeration (log(ECO.DEN)) effects;
SCF with three-year lags; p-values in parenthesis, based on White-heteroskedasticity robust standard errors.
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percentage points in terms of annual growth rate. Another point of view to look at Figure 2
is to consider a target increase in the annual growth rate of productivity of a region, say 0.8
percentage points: if all funds allocated to the region are indeed used, the funds needed to
reach this goal are about 5% of GVA of that region instead of 8%.
Finally, all regressions show evidence of conditional convergence. The coefficient of the
initial level of productivity appears to be highly significant and slightly lower for the second
and third period. However, for well-know reasons (see, e.g., Durlauf et al. (2005)) a negative
coefficient on initial income in cross-section analyses may provide misleading information on
convergence. A more exhaustive discussion of the issue of conditional convergence requires the
adoption of the distribution dynamics approach (see Fiaschi et al. (2009)).
IV.B. The Estimated Impact of SCF on Individual Regions
Figure 3 shows the estimated impact of SCF on the annual productivity growth rate of
regions according to the estimate of the best model reported in Table 5. The regions with the
highest impact (more than an annual growth rate of 0.25%) are located in the periphery of
the Europe, that is in Portugal, Spain, Ireland, North of United Kingdom, South of Italy and
Greece. On the contrary, regions of the core of Europe, i.e. of Belgium, Germany, France and
Denmark, show a very low impact, with the exception of some regions of France and United
Kingdom (between 0.05% and 0.10% in terms of annual growth rate).
Figure 4 shows that the impact of SCF on the annual productivity growth rate for the funds
given in Periods II and III only appears very similar to the estimate for the three periods.
Figure 5 reports the impact of Objective 1 funds according to the estimate of Model V in
Table 5. Regions with the highest impact appear concentrated in Ireland, Spain and Greece.
Finally, Figure 6 shows that the negative impact of Objective 2 funds according to the
estimate of Model V reported in Table 5 appears more serious in Northern Spain and Northern
England.
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Figure 3: Estimated impact of SCF on annual growth rate of productivity of individual regions
(for a better visualization Ac¸ores, Canarias and Madeira are not reported in the figure)
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Figure 4: Estimated impact of SCF on annual growth rate of
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−10 0 10 20
3
0
3
5
4
0
4
5
5
0
5
5
6
0
6
5
Non OB1
<0.15%
0.15%−0.45%
0.45%−0.75%
>0.75%
Figure 5: Estimated impact of Objective 1 funds on annual
growth rate of productivity of individual regions
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Figure 6: Estimated impact of Objective 2 funds on annual
growth rate of productivity of individual regions
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V. Robustness of results
In the following we discuss the robustness of results to the possible presence of endogeneity
and spatial dependence.
V.A. Endogeneity of Structural and Cohesion Fund
The variable SCF is potentially endogenous. Funds are indeed not allocated randomly, but
they are in principle conditional on per capita GDP, implying potential reverse causality of pro-
ductivity growth on per capita SCF (on the assumption that an increase in productivity implies
an increase in per capita GDP which, consequently, affects the SCF allocation). Moreover, in
our analysis the endogeneity of SCF could also arise by the measurement error induced both by
the use of commitments instead of payments and by our reassignment of some funds to NUTS2
regions. In order to test for the exogeneity of SCF (and its square), the Durbin-Wu-Hausman
test is performed in its regression-based form on the subperiod 1989-1999, using as instruments
all the exogenous explanatory variables of the model and some additional instruments.27
We define four instruments for SCF. The first instrument, denoted INSTR.3G, is derived
by the three-group method described in Kennedy (1992), in which the instrumental variable
takes values -1, 0 or 1 if the potentially endogenous variable is respectively in the top, middle
or bottom third of its ranking. This instrument is usually utilized when variables are subject
to measurement error. The second instrument is the lagged value of SCF (that is, the value
of SCF in the first programming period, 1975-1988, denoted as INSTR.SCF.1975 1988 ). The
latter should be a valid instrument since it is correlated with SCF of Period II and III, but it
should not be correlated with the error term. Finally, the last two instruments are variables
that, in separate analyses,28 we find to be relevant determinants of funds’allocation, that is
the regional share of population (INSTR.POP.SH.1986 1988 ), and relative per capita GDP
(INSTR.REL.GDP.1986 1988 ), that we consider by three-year average values (1986-1988) .
Accordingly, the instrument for SCF 2 derived by the three-group method, i.e. INSTR.GR2,
is calculated by SCF 2, while the other three instruments, i.e. INSTR.SCF.1975 19882,
INSTR.POP.SH.1986 19882 and INSTR.REL.GDP.1986 19882 are calculated taking the
square of respective variables.29
Table 11 in Appendix C reports the results of first-stage and second-stage regressions of
27For more details see Wooldridge (2002), pp. 118-122.
28Results are available upon request.
29Endogeneity tests assume that instruments used in the first-stage regressions are valid, i.e. they are assumed
not to be correlated with the error term. However, this cannot be the case for the type of instrument like
INSTR.3G as discussed by Fingleton and Le Gallo (2008). The Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions allows
to check the hypothesis of validity of all instruments (for more details see Wooldridge (2002), pp. 122-124). The
resulting statistics of the Sargan test of both SCF and SCF 2 is equal to 6.64 against a critical value of 122.69
while the statistics for SCF only is equal to 5.69 against a critical value of 126.31. We then conclude that all
the instruments are valid.
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Durbin-Wu-Hausman test. Results of the first-stage regression for SCF show that all the instru-
ments are statistically significant at the usual significance level. In the first-stage regression for
SCF 2 instead INSTR.REL.GDP.1986 19882 is not significant and INSTR.SCF.1977 19882 is
significant only at 10% level. The null hypothesis that SCF.1989-1999 RES and SCF.1989-1999 RES2
(the residuals of the first-stage regressions) are jointly equal to zero cannot be rejected at high
level of significance (i.e. with a p-value of 0.83). We then conclude that both SCF and SCF 2
are exogenous.
For the sake of completeness we also check for the exogeneity of SCF alone (in fact, in
some of the estimated models the effect of SCF appeared linear). Table 12 in Appendix C
reports the results of first-stage and second-stage regressions. All the instruments are statis-
tically significant at the usual significance level. The null hypothesis that the coefficient of
SCF.1989-1999 RES is equal to zero cannot be rejected at the usual significant level (p-value
is equal to 0.47). We then conclude that SCF is exogenous.
V.B. Spatial dependence
Spatial dependence across regions can be caused by a variety of factors among which the
arbitrary delineation of spatial units of observations, spatial aggregation and, most importantly,
the presence of spatial externalities and spillover effects. As pointed out by Boldrin and Canova
(2001) perhaps the regions obtained by the NUTS aggregation introduced by the European
Commission are not the appropriate units of observation, since they refer to administrative
units which do not necessarily reflect homogeneous economic characteristics. Moreover, a large
part of the empirical literature already showed the typical core-periphery structure of Europe in
terms of per worker GDP and its growth rate (see, e.g., Fiaschi and Lavezzi (2007)), suggesting
the possible presence of spatial effects.
Spatial dependence can be present in two ways: i) spatial lag dependence, i.e. spatial
correlation in the dependent variable and, ii) spatial error dependence, i.e. spatial correlation
in the error term (see, e.g., Anselin (1988) for more details).
Spatial lag models assume that the outcome in a given area (e.g. a region) is dependent
on the outcome of its neighbours. In spatial error models, instead, the spatial autocorrelation
affects the covariance structure of the random disturbance terms. The standard explanation
for this type of spatial dependence is that unmodeled effects may spill over across units of
observation resulting in spatially correlated errors.
In order to detect the possible presence of spatial dependence, a set of maximum likelihood
tests has been performed. In particular: (i) the LMerr test, which is a Lagrange Multiplier test
with a null hypothesis of no spatial dependence and has as alternative hypothesis the spatial
error model; (ii) the LMlag test, which has the same null hypothesis and has as alternative
hypothesis the spatial lag model (for more details see Anselin (2001)). A robust version of these
two tests is provided by Bera and Yoon (1993) and Anselin et al. (1996), respectively denoted
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as RLMerr and RLMlag tests. Finally, the SARMA test has the same null hypothesis of the
other tests, but has as alternative hypothesis a model with either spatial error dependence or
spatial lag dependence.
The tests of spatial dependence have been performed considering three different spatial
weight matrices, where weights are given by the inverse distance between neighbours and are
defined according to three different distance cut-offs: i) 660.8km (the same considered for
the construction of the spatial index SPATIAL.IDX used in the previous regressions), ii)
368.5km (corresponding to the second quantile of the distance distribution); and iii) 1022.8km
(corresponding to the fourth quantile).30 Results of tests are reported in Table 7.
Best Model with SCF2
d¯ LMerr LMlag RLMerr RLMlag SARMA
660.8km 2.0349
(0.1537)
1.6443
(0.1997)
0.9677
(0.3253)
0.577
(0.4475)
2.6119
(0.2709)
368.5km 2.3098
(0.1286)
1.5979
(0.2062)
1.0716
(0.3006)
0.3597
(0.5487)
2.6696
(0.2632)
1022.8km 0.1943
(0.6594)
0.0105
(0.9184)
0.2688
(0.6041)
0.085
(0.7706)
0.2793
(0.8697)
Table 7: Spatial tests for the best model. P-values in parenthesis.
All tests cannot reject the null hypothesis of no spatial dependence in the best model at
the usual significance levels. Therefore, we conclude that our OLS regressions are not biased
by spatial dependence.
VI. Concluding Remarks
This paper estimates the effect of European Union Regional Policy on productivity growth
and convergence. We find that the funds have on average a positive and a quite remarkable
impact. However, some qualifications of this general claim are needed. Firstly, the impact
appears nonlinear and funds seems to be subject to diminishing returns. In addition, not all
funds are favourable to productivity growth and convergence. A large positive effect seems to
be played by Objective 1 and Cohesion funds; on the contrary, the allocation of funds to other
objectives, in particular Objective 2, appears to hinder the efficient reallocation of resources
across sectors in European regions.
Moreover, funding in the second and third programming period that we examined seems
to have exerted the most significant effect. This finding points to the presence of a nonlinear
impact of the size of funds, in the sense that the funds started to be effective when their amount
reached a threshold level.
30For the test of spatial dependence we only use a geographical distance-based matrix instead of other possible
measure of spatial proximity (e.g. transport costs, trade flows, etc.) due to the lack of data.
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The analysis can be extended in many respects. Firstly, the impact of funds could be eval-
uated by conditioning on the output composition of regions. A particular output composition
could indeed affect the effectiveness of funds. For example, Objective 1 funds could be more
effective in regions whose output composition is more concentrated in industrial sectors, while
the opposite could hold for Objective 2. The latter conditioning, along with a control for the
institutional quality at regional level,31 could provide additional information for a more efficient
allocation of funds. Secondly, the hypothesis of whether the Regional Policy crowded out or,
on the contrary, had complementarities with investments, could be examined. This piece of in-
formation is crucial to evaluate the long-run impact of SCF on regions’ productivities. Thirdly,
further information on the long-run impact of SCF could also be obtained from the analysis of
the dynamics of regions which received funds in the past, but are no longer receiving them.
The availability of a dataset covering the fourth programming period 2000-2006 should allow
to carry out these extensions, with the further possibility to include in the analysis the regions
of the new EU accession countries, as well as to evaluate the impact of funds allocated to
specific expenditure categories.
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A List of NUTS2 Regions in the Sample
AT11 Burgenland DEA1 Du¨sseldorf FR26 Bourgogne IT52 Umbria UKD1 Cumbria
AT12 Niedero¨sterreich DEA2 Ko¨ln FR3 Nord - Pas-de-Calais IT53 Marche UKD2 Cheshire
AT13 Wien DEA3 Mu¨nster FR41 Lorraine IT6 Lazio UKD3 Greater Manchester
AT21 Ka¨rnten DEA4 Detmold FR42 Alsace IT71 Abruzzo UKD4 Lancashire
AT22 Steiermark DEA5 Arnsberg FR43 Franche-Comte´ IT72 Molise UKD5 Merseyside
AT31 Obero¨sterreich DEB1 Koblenz FR51 Pays de la Loire IT8 Campania UKE1 East Riding, North Lincol.
AT32 Salzburg DEB2 Trier FR52 Bretagne IT91 Puglia UKE2 North Yorkshire
AT33 Tirol DEB3 Rheinhessen-Pfalz FR53 Poitou-Charentes IT92 Basilicata UKE3 South Yorkshire
AT34 Vorarlberg DEC Saarland FR61 Aquitaine IT93 Calabria UKE4 West Yorkshire
BE1 Re´g. Bruxelles DEF Schleswig-Holstein FR62 Midi-Pyre´ne´es ITA Sicilia UKF1 Derbyshire, Nottingh.
BE21 Antwerpen DK Danmark FR63 Limousin ITB Sardegna UKF2 Leicestershire, Rutland
BE22 Limburg (B) ES11 Galicia FR71 Rhoˆne-Alpes LU Luxembourg and Northamptonshire
BE23 Oost-Vlaanderen ES12 Principado de Asturias FR72 Auvergne NL11 Groningen UKF3 Lincolnshire
BE24 Vlaams Brabant ES13 Cantabria FR81 Languedoc-Roussillon NL12 Friesland UKG1 Herefordshire, Worcest.
BE25 West-Vlaanderen ES21 Pais Vasco FR82 Prov.-Alpes-Coˆte d’Azur NL13 Drenthe and Warwickshire
BE31 Brabant Wallon ES22 Comunidad de Navarra FR83 Corse NL21 Overijssel UKG2 Shropshire and Staffordshire
BE32 Hainaut ES23 La Rioja GR11 Anatoliki Mak., Thraki NL22 Gelderland UKG3 West Midlands
BE33 Lie`ge ES24 Arago´n GR12 Kentriki Makedonia NL31 Utrecht UKH1 East Anglia
BE34 Luxembourg (B) ES3 Comunidad de Madrid GR13 Dytiki Makedonia NL32 Noord-Holland UKH2 Bedfordshire, Hertford.
BE35 Namur ES41 Castilla y Leo´n GR14 Thessalia NL33 Zuid-Holland UKH3 Essex
DE11 Stuttgart ES42 Castilla-la Mancha GR21 Ipeiros NL34 Zeeland UKI1 Inner London
DE12 Karlsruhe ES43 Extremadura GR22 Ionia Nisia NL41 Noord-Brabant UKI2 Outer London
DE13 Freiburg ES51 Catalua GR23 Dytiki Ellada NL42 Limburg (NL) UKJ1 Berkshire, Buckinghamshire
DE14 Tu¨bingen ES52 Comunidad Valenciana GR24 Sterea Ellada PT11 Norte and Oxfordshire
DE21 Oberbayern ES53 Islas Baleares GR25 Peloponnisos PT12 Centro (P) UKJ2 Surrey, East, West Sussex
DE22 Niederbayern ES61 Andalucia GR3 Attiki PT13 Lisboa, Vale do Tejo UKJ3 Hampshire, Isle of Wight
DE23 Oberpfalz ES62 Regio´n de Murcia GR41 Voreio Aigaio PT14 Alentejo UKJ4 Kent
DE24 Oberfranken ES63 Ceuta y Melilla GR42 Notio Aigaio PT15 Algarve UKK1 Gloucestershire, Wiltshire
DE25 Mittelfranken ES7 Canarias GR43 Kriti PT2 Ac¸ores and North Somerset
DE26 Unterfranken FI13 Ita¨-Suomi IE01 Border, Mid., Western PT3 Madeira UKK2 Dorset, Somerset
DE27 Schwaben FI18 Etela¨-Suomi IE02 Southern and Eastern SE01 Stockholm UKK3 Cornwall, Isles of Scilly
DE5 Bremen FI19 La¨nsi-Suomi IT11 Piemonte SE02 O¨stra Mellansverige UKK4 Devon
DE6 Hamburg FI1A Pohjois-Suomi IT12 Valle d’Aosta SE04 Sydsverige UKL1 West Wales, The Valleys
DE71 Darmstadt FI2 land IT13 Liguria SE06 Norra Mellansverige UKL2 East Wales
DE72 Gießen FR1 Iˆle de France IT2 Lombardia SE07 Mellersta Norrland UKM1 North Eastern Scotland
DE73 Kassel FR21 Champagne-Ardenne IT31 Trentino-Alto Adige SE08 O¨vre Norrland UKM2 Eastern Scotland
DE91 Braunschweig FR22 Picardie IT32 Veneto SE09 Sma˚land med o¨arna UKM3 South Western Scotland
DE92 Hannover FR23 Haute-Normandie IT33 Friuli-Venezia Giulia SE0A Va¨stsverige UKM4 Highlands and Islands
DE93 Lu¨neburg FR24 Centre IT4 Emilia-Romagna UKC1 Tees Valley UKN Northern Ireland
DE94 Weser-Ems FR25 Basse-Normandie IT51 Toscana UKC2 Northumberland
B Descriptive Statistics of Variables
GR.PROD PROD.REL INV.RATE EMP.GR ECO.DEN SPAT.INDEX
Mean 0.02 1.00 0.20 0.04 7.47 0.51
St.Dev. 0.01 0.35 0.06 0.01 25.85 3.04
AGRI MANU MIN CONS NOMARKS FIN
Mean 0.06 0.22 0.03 0.08 0.23 0.05
St.Dev. 0.07 0.09 0.05 0.03 0.06 0.02
HOT TRAN WHOL OTH SCF PAY
Mean 0.04 0.06 0.11 0.14 0.01 0.01
St.Dev. 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.04
Table 8: Mean and standard deviation of variables used in regressions.
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PROD.REL INV.RATE EMP.GR ECO.DEN SPAT.INDEX AGRI
PROD.REL 1 0.16 0.11 0.53 0.08 −0.55
INV.RATE 0.16 1 0.19 −0.24 0.16 0.22
EMP.GR 0.11 0.19 1 0.11 −0.10 −0.33
ECO.DEN 0.53 −0.24 0.11 1 −0.01 −0.64
SPAT.INDEX 0.83 0.28 0.07 0.32 1 −0.48
AGRI −0.55 0.22 −0.33 −0.64 0.12 1
MANU 0.22 −0.20 −0.11 0.21 −0.01 −0.35
MIN 0.09 −0.04 −0.02 −0.03 0.00 0.04
CONS 0.04 0.49 0.14 −0.28 0.13 0.07
NONMARKS 0.29 −0.06 0.21 0.27 −0.04 −0.45
FIN 0.40 0.12 0.07 0.49 −0.07 −0.37
HOT −0.43 0.04 0.15 −0.33 −0.06 0.27
TRAN 0.01 0.03 0.20 0.18 −0.10 −0.25
WHOL −0.28 0.03 −0.01 0.00 −0.26 0.23
OTH 0.30 −0.30 0.14 0.45 0.13 −0.48
SCF −0.50 0.26 0.01 −0.29 0.07 0.45
PAY −0.46 0.26 0.09 −0.22 0.06 0.30
Table 9: Correlations between variables used in regressions
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MANU MIN CONS NONMARKS FIN HOT
PROD.REL 0.22 0.09 0.04 0.29 0.40 −0.43
INV.RATE −0.20 −0.04 0.49 −0.06 0.12 0.04
EMP.GR −0.11 −0.02 0.14 0.21 0.07 0.15
ECO.DEN 0.21 −0.03 −0.28 0.27 0.49 −0.33
SPAT.INDEX −0.01 0.00 0.13 −0.04 −0.07 −0.06
AGRI −0.35 0.05 0.07 −0.45 −0.37 0.27
MANU 1 −0.16 −0.11 −0.34 −0.11 −0.31
MIN −0.16 1 −0.16 −0.01 −0.21 −0.08
CONS −0.11 −0.16 1 0.06 −0.03 −0.14
NONMARKS −0.34 −0.01 0.06 1 0.18 −0.36
FIN -0.11 −0.21 −0.03 0.18 1 −0.16
HOT −0.31 −0.08 −0.14 −0.36 −0.16 1
TRAN −0.23 −0.18 −0.12 0.06 0.32 0.09
WHOL −0.42 −0.20 −0.17 −0.11 0.06 0.27
OTH −0.05 −0.27 −0.18 0.28 0.27 −0.13
SCF −0.40 0.01 0.27 −0.16 −0.19 0.25
PAY −0.37 0.00 0.31 −0.09 −0.11 0.21
TRAN WHOL OTH SCF PAY
PROD.REL 0.01 −0.28 0.30 −0.50 −0.46
INV.RATE 0.03 0.03 −0.30 0.26 0.26
EMP.GR 0.20 −0.01 0.14 0.01 0.09
ECO.DEN 0.18 0.00 0.45 −0.29 −0.22
SPAT.INDEX −0.10 −0.26 0.13 0.07 0.06
AGRI −0.25 0.23 −0.48 0.45 0.30
MANU −0.23 −0.42 −0.05 −0.40 −0.37
MIN −0.18 −0.20 −0.27 0.01 0.00
CONS −0.12 −0.17 −0.18 0.27 0.31
NONMARKS 0.06 −0.11 0.28 −0.16 −0.09
FIN 0.32 0.06 0.27 −0.19 −0.11
HOT 0.09 0.27 −0.13 0.25 0.21
TRAN 1 0.25 0.14 0.16 0.23
WHOL 0.25 1 −0.11 0.25 0.20
OTH 0.14 −0.11 1 −0.30 −0.23
SCF 0.16 0.25 −0.30 1 0.96
PAY 0.23 0.20 −0.23 0.96 1
Table 10: Continued: Correlations between variables used in regressions
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C Test of Endogeneity of SCF
First Stage Estimation Second Stage Estimation
Dependent Variable SCF (1989-1999) SCF2 (1989-1999) γ (1992-2002)
COUNTRY DUMMIES YES YES YES
SECTORAL CONTROLS YES YES YES
SPATIAL CONTROLS YES YES YES
Intercept 0.1262
(0.0611)
0.0653
(0.0080)
−0.1000
(0.0000)
log(PROD.1992) 0.0341
(0.1078)
0.0046
(0.4282)
−0.0158
(0.0007)
log(EMP.GR.1992 2002) 0.0003
(0.9522)
0.0009
(0.8348)
−0.0188
(0.0000)
log(ECO.DEN.1992 2002) 0.0206
(0.0004)
0.0064
(0.0029)
−0.0012
(0.0879)
INSTR.SCF.1977 1988 2.5030
(0.0009)
INSTR.3G −0.0193
(0.0000)
INSTR.REL.GDP.1986 1988 −0.0305
(0.0448)
INSTR.POP.SH.1986 1988 −0.0255
(0.000)
INSTR.SCF.1977 19882 13.0679
(0.0973)
INSTR.3G2 −0.0041
(0.0022)
INSTR.REL.GDP.1986 19882 −0.0037
(0.4831)
INSTR.POP.SH.1986 19882 0.0032
(0.0019)
SCF.1989 1999 0.1082
(0.0316)
SCF.1989 19992 −0.1169
(0.4393)
SCF.1989-1999 RES −0.0264
(0.4847)
SCF.1989-1999 RES2 0.0508
(0.6733)
Obs. 173 R¯2 = 0.77 R¯2 = 0.64 R¯2 = 0.67
F-Test H0: SCF.1989-1999 RES = SCF.1989-1999 RES2=0
F= 0.1916, Pr(>F)=0.83
Table 11: Exogeneity test of SCF and SCF 2. P-values in parenthesis. SCF.1989-1999 RES
and SCF.1989− 1999 RES2 are respectively the residuals of first-stage regressions.
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First Stage Estimation Second Stage Estimation
Dependent Variable SCF (1989-1999) γ (1992-2002)
COUNTRY DUMMIES YES YES
SECTORAL CONTROLS YES YES
SPATIAL CONTROLS YES YES
Intercept 0.1409
(0.0545)
−0.1061
(0.0000)
log(PROD.1992) 0.0383
(0.0712)
−0.0158
(0.0007)
log(EMP.GR.1992 2002) −0.0159
(0.2662)
−0.0211
(0.0000)
log(ECO.DEN.1992 2002) 0.0205
(0.0003)
−0.0013
(0.0478)
INSTR.SCF.1977 1988 2.2800
(0.0001)
INSTR.3G −0.0191
(0.0000)
INSTR.REL.GDP.1986 1988 −0.0325
(0.0400)
INSTR.POP.SH.1986 1988 −0.0252
(0.0000)
SCF.1989 1999 0.0763
(0.0008)
SCF.1989-1999 RES −0.0200
(0.4703)
Obs. 173 R¯2 = 0.77 R¯2 = 0.68
Table 12: Exogeneity test of SCF. P-values in parenthesis.
